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Argentina and the United States 
at the Sixth Pan American Conference 
(Havana 1928) 
I - Introduction 
In 1928, at the Sixth Pan American Conference (Sixth Conference of American 
States) in Havana, Argentine delegation chief Honorio Pueyrredon boldly 
challenged United States military intervention in Latin America and, in a lesser 
criticism, opposed high US tariff barriers. On 4 February, during a meeting of 
the conference Committee on Public International Law, Pueyrredon introduced 
for the first time at a Pan American Conference an open declaration against US 
military intervention. In support of the Central American nations, Pueyrredon 
defended the sovereignty of each nation state in the hemisphere: 'diplomatic or 
armed intervention, whether permanent or temporary ' , he declared, 'is an attack 
against the independence of states and is not justified by the duty of protecting 
nations, as weak nations are, in their turn, unable to exercise such right.... '1 
Reported in newspapers around the world, Pueyrredon's challenge to the 
United States' right to intervene in Latin America was explosive. It threatened 
to embroil the Pan American Union in an issue which, until 1928, had been the 
exclusive concern of the United States and the individual nations occupied by 
US expeditionary forces.2 The Argentine delegation chief raised the anti-
intervention issue at a time when policy-makers in Washington felt their 
diplomatic stand on military intercession was dangerously prone to criticism 
from abroad. The Sixth Pan American Conference began during an escalation 
of United States military activity in Nicaragua; through late 1927 and early 
1928, United States Marine units made new forays into territory held by 
Augusto Sandino, in search of the rebel leader 's base camp. At the same time, 
throughout the hemisphere, public condemnations by politicians, journalists, 
and others mounted. The State Department felt precariously exposed.3 
Since the Havana Conference, taking account of these public condemnations 
of US military adventurism, the historical literature in both Argentina and the 
United States has portrayed the confrontat ion that fol lowed Pueyrredon 's 
c o m m e n t s in t e r m s l i m i t e d by o f f i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s and p r e s s r e p o r t s . 
Immediately after the meeting, newspapers in tens of countries, many Argentine 
leaders, and the United States Department of State adopted a version of events 
holding that Pueyrredon offered a strong Argentine challenge to US interests 
in Latin America. This challenge placed in jeopardy United States foreign 
po l i cy o b j e c t i v e s f o r the h e m i s p h e r e , and ran the r isk of m a r s h a l l i n g 
widespread Latin American political opposition to US military activity in 
Central America. Until now, much of the historical literature on the clash has 
posited that the United States countered the anti-interventionist challenge 
through the diplomacy of United States delegation chief and former Secretary 
of State Charles Evans Hughes. The historian Samuel Flagg Bemis and others 
have reasoned that, by means of his outstanding diplomatic skills, Hughes 
garnered sufficient diplomatic support at Havana to defeat the attack and the 
risk to United States interests in Latin America.4 
The Hughes versus Pueyrredon equation of conflict, as documented in the 
majori ty of historical works on the Sixth Conference, addresses an important 
d ip lomat ic facet of Argent ine-Uni ted States relat ions and Pan Amer ican 
interactions in the late 1920s. In the sections that follow, this study will recast 
the equation to suggest a broader scope to the problem of United States-
Argentine conflict at Havana. Section II, 'Uni ted States Preparations for 
Havana : E f fec t ing Con t ro l ' , cha l lenges the State Depar tmen t vers ion of 
Hughes ' s diplomatic triumph. It proposes that, while the diplomacy of the 
United States delegation chief proved essential to US control at the Pan 
Amer ican assembly, Hughes did not arrive at the gathering, as the State 
Department maintained publicly, with nothing but his diplomatic abilities to 
confront and defeat anti-intervention. Without the knowledge of the public, the 
international press, and most delegates, Hughes reached Havana after months 
of State Department preparation that won promises f rom most Latin American 
states not to contradict United States policy. In addition, despite the ostensibly 
open and democratic functioning of the Pan American Union, Washington 
adopted a determined strategy to suppress discussion of any topic the United 
States government deemed controversial. 
United States officials were unable to master complete control of the confer-
ence agenda, but gained strong support for their positions. This drive for 
authority reveals three notable features of US expansionism in the late 1920s. 
First, in spite of the hegemonic influence the United States enjoyed in much of 
Latin America, authorities in Washington feared the implications of a South 
American diplomatic challenge to US military activity in Central America. 
Second, the US tactic of approaching individual nations for support, while 
keep ing each coun t ry ' s leaders unaware of equiva lent back ing garnered 
elsewhere in the Americas, marked the first extensive use of a control method 
the Un i t ed Sta tes wou ld apply s u c c e s s f u l l y at later Pan A m e r i c a n and 
Organisation of American States meetings, including the Pan American Union 
Foreign Minis ters ' Meet ings during World War II and the 1954 Caracas 
Conference. Third, the lead-up to Havana provides stark evidence for a unity 
of pu rpose and me thod in Uni ted Sta tes imper ia l i sm in Lat in Amer ica . 
Al though the United States sent no Mar ines and establ ished no mili tary 
administrations south of the Caribbean basin, the Havana preparations show 
that Washington could not divorce unrest in Central America f rom its relations 
with the South American countries. Moreover, while strategies varied f rom 
nation to nation, the United States sought short- and long-term ends in Latin 
America through methods and tactics that stressed overriding control. 
Section III, 'The Conflict at Havana ' , explores the Argentine challenge and 
the United States response. It argues that in its final form, Honorio Pueyrre-
don 's stand on United States military activity in Nicaragua and, secondarily, on 
high US tariff walls, reflected the personal and politically-motivated action of 
one individual. It did not represent Argentine government policy on anti-
imperialism, opposition to US militarism, solidarity with neighbouring Latin 
American states, or anger over US trade policies, though elements of each of 
these factors were manifest in Argentine politics. Pueyrredon's failure, and his 
eventual censure and removal as delegation chief by the Argentine government, 
contrasts the disorder and weakness of Argentine international influence with 
the successful United States exercise of control. 
Section IV, 'Perspectives on the Argentine Challenge' , interprets Pueyrre-
don ' s actions in the context of domestic political issues (in particular, the 
weakness of President Marcelo T. de Alvear), the delegation chief ' s ministerial 
aspirations, and tacit Argentine support in advance of the Havana Conference 
for the United States position on Nicaragua. Section V, 'Conclusion: Consoli-
dating Control ' , f rames the Havana Conference between earlier efforts by 
Washington to exert authority within the Pan American Union, the accompany-
ing rise of US economic influence in Argentina and other Latin America states, 
and the short-lived consolidation of US dominance after the Sixth meeting - at 
the 1928-1929 Washington Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration. This 
section contemplates the collapse of that supremacy with the onset of the Great 
Depress ion and the emboldened ant i - in tervent ionism of Latin American 
delegates to the Seventh Conference of American States in 1933. 
II - United States Preparations for Havana: 
Effecting Control 
In 1928, at Havana, the United States backed an agenda that stressed economic 
questions, including maritime neutrality, simplification of consular procedures, 
regulation of rail traffic, and agricultural cooperation. Yet, in its preparations 
for the conference, the US government was concerned principally that some 
nations might introduce controversial topics for discussion. Secretary of State 
Frank B. Kellogg called for their suppression. The Secretary singled out the 
danger of an anti-imperialist statement at Havana. During the preceding year, 
anti-US propaganda had escalated throughout the hemisphere. While United 
States military and political intervention in Central American predated the First 
World War, extensive Latin American opposition to these incursions began only 
during the 1920s. Popular outcries scorned a series of United States interven-
tionist tactics in Nicaragua that seemed to threaten the security of all nations 
in the hemisphere. 
When the Conservative former president Emiliano Chamorro lost the 1924 
Nicaraguan general election, he staged a coup that launched the nation into civil 
war for the remainder of the decade, as the ousted vice-president, Juan B. 
Sacasa, mounted an armed struggle to regain the government. The United 
States responded with a new landing of Marines, which suppressed the fighting 
and oversaw a coup d 'etat by the conservative general, Adolfo Diaz, in late 
1926. After the United States recognised the illegitimate usurper, most of 
Sacasa 's officers ceased combat. One exception was General Augusto Sandino, 
whose armed resistance to the US military presence inspired criticism of the 
United States throughout Latin America, sparking Kel logg 's fears in 1927. 
Between May 1927 and March 1928, forty-one US warships regularly patrolled 
Nicaraguan waters. Over roughly the same period, the United States govern-
ment spent some $3.5 million on military operations in Nicaragua.5 
In the United States, as in Latin America, 1927 brought public reassessments 
of the US role in Latin America that troubled Secretary Kellogg and other State 
Department officials. Writing in the periodical Foreign Affairs, the political 
commentator Walter Lippman called for a new policy towards Latin America 
'as momentous as the Monroe Doctrine i tself ' . The conflict precipitating this 
need for review was what Lippman contrasted as ' the vested rights of [North] 
Americans in the natural resources of the Caribbean countries and the rising 
nationalism of their peoples ' . In an analysis that highlighted the exacerbation 
of the crisis, as he described it, and Kel logg 's growing preoccupation with 
Nicaragua, Lippman noted that this 'problem could not have arisen before 
[North] Americans had acquired titles to important properties and had invested 
large sums of money developing them; nor... while government of these 
countries was in the hands of a ruling class which conceived its interests to be 
those of the foreign owners. . . ' Lippman attacked the fallacies of United States 
mi l i t a ry in te rven t ion and the M o n r o e Doc t r ine i tself (a fo re ign po l icy 
mechanism that Kellogg insisted be upheld rigorously by US delegates at 
Havana); the United States government had reached a stage where not only 
could European intervention in the event of Latin American political disorder 
not be tolerated, but political disorder itself could not be allowed. 'From this 
point it was but a short step to the theory that the United States must insure 
itself in the Caribbean region against supposedly unfriendly governments . ' 6 
Kellogg 's reputation as a red-baiting anti-Bolshevist received more direct 
cr i t icism in the United States Congress . When the Secretary issued the 
d o c u m e n t 'Bo l shev ik Aims and Pol ic ies in Lat in A m e r i c a ' , ou t l in ing a 
purported Soviet conspiracy in Mexico and Nicaragua, both he and President 
Calvin Coolidge were called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (in 
January 1927). Senators chided Kellogg for his scanty evidence of a Bolshevik 
threat. A number of congressmen were equally critical; Representative Ralph 
F. Lozier argued to his colleagues that Kel logg 's efforts ' to link the Govern-
ment of Mexico with the Bolshevik regime in Russia is both amazing and 
ridiculous ' . ' W e should not use our Army and Navy ' , Lozier reasoned, ' to 
fight their [Central American] batt les ' . Representative George Huddleston 
reported his dismay that Coolidge had intervened in Nicaragua ' for the purpose 
of establishing the particular government that happens to satisfy him... . '7 
By mid-1927, Kellogg felt embattled by the denunciations of his policies on 
Central America, both at home and abroad. By some accounts, he showed 
signs of exhaustion in early 1928.8 His solution, with regard to Havana, was 
to attempt an unprecedented control of conference proceedings. Were Latin 
American delegates at Havana to criticise the United States military presence 
in Nicaragua, Kellogg recommended that the complainants be silenced. 'Every 
effor t ' , wrote the secretary, 'should be made to have the topics discussed at the 
Conference confined to those on the pre-arranged agenda, or such additional 
topics as do not involve any discussion or criticism of the foreign policy of this 
or any other country. ' During 1927, increasingly sensitive to attacks against its 
Latin America policy, the United States prepared extensively for the Havana 
Conference . Argent ina was one of several countr ies in which the State 
Department identified dangerous anti-US activity. A First Bank of Boston 
official described a growing Argentine fixation on United States intervention 
in Mexico and Nicaragua and observed, 'it is impossible to remove from the 
Latin American mind the idea of the Great North American Octopus, spreading 
its tentacles all over Latin America ' . The United States government suspected 
what its representatives called Bolsheviks, Communists, and Anarchists as the 
organisers of anti-US criticisms in Argentina and elsewhere. Leaders in the 
United States were distressed as well about Mexican, British, and Japanese 
government support for anti-US propaganda in Buenos Aires and the potentially 
negative effect such activity might have on United States commerce.9 
The United States focused much of its attention on a pan-hemispheric 
organisation identified as posing a significant threat to United States diplomatic 
authority, and as a propaganda vehicle of the Soviet Union. The full danger (as 
US leaders perceived it) of the Anti-imperialistic League (a transnational body 
with headquarters in Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and other Latin American 
capitals), and its associations with the Soviet Union, had become apparent in 
Washington only months before the Havana Conference . The League ' s 
objectives included the liberation of the US colonial possessions Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines, the removal of US troops from Haiti and Nicaragua, as 
well as a US military withdrawal f rom Panama. Through several well-
circulating publications, and with the backing of Diego Rivera and other 
prominent Latin American anti-imperialists, the organisation's leaders were 
spreading their arguments and gaining adherents from Mexico to Chile.10 
US diplomats conveyed data to Washington on Communis t and Anti-
imperialistic League activities throughout the Americas. In early 1928, the 
State Department found evidence of fierce anti-US propaganda in Uruguay and 
Guatemala. In Argentina, the United States Ambassador reported the formation 
of a new organisation critical of the 'unjustif ied and unspeakable Yankee 
invasion of Nicaragua' - the Liga Pro Union Americana. When the group 
mounted a protest in front of the Bank of Boston Building in Buenos Aires, 
Robert Woods Bliss protested to the Argentine Foreign Relations Ministry. 
Socialist politician Alfredo L. Palacios, another outspoken critic of imperialism 
in the months before Havana, lamented publicly that 'when the bankers were 
British, the Monroe Doctrine defended us. But who will defend us today f rom 
the grandchildren of Monroe? ' Palacios criticised the Pan American Union as 
a ' fa i thful instrument ' of imperial ism." 
United States off ic ia ls were troubled fur ther by mainst ream Argent ine 
political opposition to the US military presence in Nicaragua. In mid-1927, 
responding to congressional pressures, the President of the Argentine Senate 
acted on a resolution calling Foreign Minister Angel P. Gallardo before that 
body. Leopoldo Melo invited Gallardo to explain the Executive off ice position 
on the US intervention in Nicaragua; the Foreign Ministry demurred and 
congressional rebukes carried on unabated. Argentine press reports in the 
weeks before the conference were replete with criticisms of United States 
military intervention in Nicaragua. Jorge Mitre, publisher of the generally pro-
US La Nation, and regarded in Washington as an ally of the United States, 
denounced the foreign military actions in Nicaragua; they represented a ' test ' 
of Pan Americanism, he asserted, and the Latin American states were entitled 
to an ' e x p l a n a t i o n ' f r o m the Uni t ed Sta tes . The n e w s p a p e r La Razon 
distinguished between the supposed idealism of Woodrow Wilson 's foreign 
policy and United States aggressiveness in Central America: 'greatness and 
power are dis-Americanising the United States. This refers to the barbarous 
kick administered Sandino - the fatherland of Wilson making war against a 
petty leader of Central America! '1 2 
R e s p o n d i n g to these and o the r f o r e b o d i n g s igns of La t in A m e r i c a n 
discontent, and what Kellogg believed were Communist pressures, the State 
Department prepared for Havana by warning its diplomats of an impending 
anti-US attack. Secretary Kellogg instructed United States Legations to gather 
information on the likelihood of each nat ion 's participating in such a confronta-
tion. The State Department also asked that governments be canvassed for their 
blanket support of US positions at Havana.1 3 Kellogg was openly antagonistic 
towards Latin American sensibili t ies over United States imperial ism. In 
November 1927, he wrote to Robert Woods Bliss that Mexican criticisms of 
United States foreign policy were no more than the jealousy of a nation that 
lacked the power and influence of Washington. Not being able to afford the 
'protection that one sovereign nation is entitled to demand f rom another ' , the 
Mexicans waxed bitter at the US ability to do so. Kellogg bullishly insisted on 
the positive United States record in Mexico: 
If I had the time, I could just ify every act we have performed; in fact, we 
have been patient beyond any degree to which we would ordinarily be 
with a more responsible government. The same is true as to Central 
American countries. The United States has no desire to dominate them, 
as you know but it is hard to make these countries realise that we are not 
imperialistic and ambitious.14 
Assistant Secretary of State Francis White warned US diplomats that some 
delegates might try to ' inject into the Conference controversial subjects and 
matters of a political nature which this Government feels do not properly 
belong on the agenda of a Pan American Conference, and do not promote the 
best interests of Pan-Americanism' . The State Department wished to know 
how delegates from each country would respond to such potentially sudden 
diplomatic manoeuvres once the conference began.13 
As the conference approached, the State Department received more galling 
evidence of a coming challenge to United States authority in Latin America. 
The US ambassador in Uruguay learned that the Cuban government was 
apprehensive that 'certain political questions' might be brought before the 
conference, at the instigation of the Mexican government. The Cubans wished 
to avoid controversy. 'I was convinced' , wrote Ulysses Grant-Smith, of the 
Cuban diplomat who disclosed the information, ' that he had full knowledge of 
the matter but the most that I could extract from him was that he thought that 
its purport was anti-Yankee. ' At the end of 1927, Grant-Smith sounded the 
alarm again in a terse te legram. He reported f rom Montevideo that the 
Mexicans and other Latin American governments planned to introduce a formal 
agreement at Havana by which no state would be permitted to intervene in the 
affairs of another.16 
US diplomats fo l lowed the State Depar tmen t ' s instructions to counter 
possible antagonism to US foreign policy. During the last three months of 
1927, they gained the adherence of a majority of Pan American Union member 
governments to bolster US conference measures. The Peruvian government 
gave the United States assurances that their delegates would support the United 
States without fail. The US Minister in Tegucigalpa, George T. Summerlin, 
relayed to Kellogg that he had 'good reason to believe' that the Hondurans 
would be instructed to 'entertain views similar to those of the delegates of the 
United States ' . The Guatemalan, Haitian, Colombian, Dominican, Nicaraguan, 
Costa Rican, Brazilian, Salvadoran, Venezuelan, and Bolivian governments 
p ro f fe red s imilar assurances . Al though Chile did not give an i ronclad 
guarantee of support, the US Charge d 'Affa i res in Santiago correctly predicted 
that the Chilean delegates would not contradict the United States at Havana.17 
Months before, the State Department had ensured the cooperation of the host 
country. In April 1927, the chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs 
travelled with the President of Cuba on the train f rom Key West to Washington. 
Stokeley W. Morgan asked Gerardo Machado what the latter anticipated at the 
Havana Conference: 
I reminded him that a certain tendency to inject controversial political 
subjects into the discussions had become apparent in Santiago in 1923 and 
that it was not impossible that this tendency might be even more marked 
in Habana next year. The President said he realised that fact and was 
taking steps to guard against any injection of undesirable matter into the 
discussions. The control of this he said rested entirely with the President 
of the Conference.1 8 
The Cuban president of the Conference, Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, 
would have strict ins t ruct ions f r o m Gera rdo Machado not to permit the 
discussion of subjects embarrassing to the United States. 
The State Department also received a promise f rom Angel Gallardo that 
Argentina was opposed to the introduction of controversial themes. Ambassa-
dor Bliss was conf ident enough about the pro-US posi t ions of delegates 
Honorio Pueyrredon and Felipe Espil that he reported it unnecessary to submit 
detailed reports on the two diplomats. The Argentine representative who most 
perplexed Bliss was Laurentino Olascoaga, who had suggested the formation 
of an i l l -def ined ' L e a g u e Be tween the States of South A m e r i c a ' . The 
Argentine delegate was an unknown quantity, but US leaders believed they 
could manipulate him:19 
[He] is somewhat ridiculed because of affecting the tonsorial style of 
colonial days and cultivating a resemblance to General San Martin. His 
influence in the Argentine delegation will be very secondary to that of 
Ambassador Pueyrredon and Dr. Espil.... He is, however, worth cultivat-
ing and is not adverse to flattery.20 
Bliss confirmed that the Argentine government had selected its delegation 
with the provision that it work 'in complete understanding' with the United 
States. The Argentine Foreign Ministry informed Bliss that Pueyrredon had 
been instructed specifically not to discuss contentious subjects or any themes 
not i temised in the pre-arranged agenda. The contradict ion between this 
assurance and the Argentine delegation chief ' s eventual outburst underlined the 
absence of a resolute Argentine conference agenda, comparable to that of the 
United States. It also showed that the ' i ronclad ' guarantees of support that 
Secretary Kellogg sought, and believed he had won, in advance of the Havana 
Conference, were not, in fact, ironclad. 
Ill - The Conflict at Havana 
Delegates arrived at Havana to address problems in three broad areas: the 
organisation of the Pan American Union, the codification and adoption of a 
t reaty of publ ic and pr ivate internat ional law, and social and economic 
problems of common interest in the Americas. Conferees conducted their work 
in committees composed of one or more representatives and technical assistants 
f rom each state. As preparations for the gathering were completed, Argentine 
authorities tempered assurances of support for the United States with a last-
minute agenda change. Early in January 1928, Gallardo had confirmed to the 
p ress his g o v e r n m e n t ' s in ten t ion not to ra ise the cause of N i c a r a g u a n 
sovereignty at Havana. Speaking to reporters in Paris, he adopted the US 
maxim of strict adherence to the pre-conference agenda (which did not include 
a discussion of the United States presence in Central America). He explained, 
' the Nicaragua problem is not on the agenda [of the Havana Conference] and 
since it is not on the list of subjects to be treated I do not think it will come 
up ' . But in the international climate of growing hostility to United States 
military interventions abroad, the Argentine government decided it did not wish 
to be publicly identified with Yankee imperialism.21 
The Foreign Ministry prepared a new plan, in the event an anti-intervention 
motion were introduced. On 13 January, three days before the conference 
opened, the Foreign Ministry sent Argentine delegates modified instructions. 
Were another delegation to introduce a Nicaraguan resolution, the Argentine 
government wished to adopt a timid, but clearly stated supportive position. 
Acting Foreign Minister Antonio Sagarna ordered delegation chief Pueyrredon 
to choose an opportune moment to argue for the sovereignty of states and their 
interdependence, without openly confronting the United States. Should the 
opportunity arise, the Foreign Ministry wished to offer a non-committal voice 
of support to its sister Latin American republics - 'sin entrar a juzgar el estado 
de las relaciones juridicas entre los Estados Unidos de America y Nica-
ragua'.22 
Five days later the Foreign Ministry moved still farther from its guarantee 
of support to the United States. The change was perhaps in response to the 
Buenos Aires press corps, whose rebukes of Argentina 's failure to define a 
forceful pre-conference position on Nicaragua were mounting. More likely, the 
Foreign Ministry had begun to anticipate what the State Department had seen 
for months as imminent. In that a confrontation over US military intervention 
in Central America was a virtual certainty, Argentina might effect a diplomatic 
coup by being the first to raise objections. Yet, if worded carefully, the 
grievance might be ambiguous enough to avoid alienating the United States; by 
opposing intervention while o f fe r ing a broad-based endorsement of US 
economic resolutions, the Argentines might remain true to the spirit, if not to 
the letter, of their promise to back the United States on all issues. On 18 
January, Sagarna asked whether Pueyrredon thought it advantageous for 
Argentina to take the initiative on anti-intervention. Sagarna wanted Pueyrre-
don ' s opinion on an independent Argent ine statement at the conference , 
supporting Nicaragua, but not openly bellicose towards the United States.23 
On 26 January, Pueyrredon responded to Sagarna 's instructions, setting the 
stage for his conference stance on US military aggression. He did not answer 
Sagarna directly, but informed the Foreign Ministry that he expected an 
opportunity for an Argentine initiative on Nicaragua. Pueyrredon wrote that he 
would issue the declarations the Foreign Ministry called for at conference 
discussions on the rights of sovereign states. In the tenacity of his stand, 
however, Pueyrredon planned to manipulate the Foreign Ministry 's intent into 
a personal political gambit.24 
As the conference opened, the United States remained unable to calculate 
precisely how, or from what quarters, an attack on military intervention might 
be launched. This was scarcely surprising. The State Department had accurate 
information on mounting Latin American anti-imperialist sentiment, but erred 
in its suspicions of possible collusion and conspiracy among nations. Kellogg 
ant ic ipated incorrectly that an attack against the Uni ted States had been 
thought-out by one or more nations long in advance of the Sixth Pan American 
Conference. On the contrary, both Pueyrredon 's challenge and a similar 
criticism by Salvadoran delegate Gustavo Guerrero were made against stated 
Argentine and Salvadoran government policies. Nevertheless, the United States 
was prepared for a carefully planned, open diplomatic revolt within the Pan 
American Union. 
Following US conference objectives of commercial normalisation, the Public 
International Law Committee was formed to determine means of implementing 
a vast body of exis t ing internat ional agreements . The ponente25 of the 
committee was Dr. Victor Maurtua of Peru. Maur tua ' s allegiance to the United 
States led to an interpretation of international law which other delegates found 
cavalier and menacing - and which formed the backdrop to Pueyrredon 's 4 
February critique of diplomatic and armed intervention. Conference partici-
pants were surprised when Maurtua tried to couch the commit tee ' s consider-
ation of international relations in nothing more than a vague declaration of 
principles. This would serve supposedly as the basis for future legal codifica-
tion. In practical terms, an imprecise agenda would limit the debate on United 
States intervention in Central America. Maurtua put forward his concept of an 
in te rdependence of nat ions . He argued this pr inciple be fo re commi t t ee 
delegates, insisting that an absolute independence of nations could not exist.26 
The implication of the ponente's reasoning was that Nicaragua and other 
na t ions could not expec t ou t r igh t i ndependence , as de f ined in the anti-
imperialist arguments of some delegates. Many participants immediately 
der ided M a u r t u a ' s content ion as unacceptab ly open to a broad range of 
interpretations - precisely the ambiguity sought by the United States. The 
committee broke down into two competing camps. Those opposing the ponente 
favoured a formal codification of international law and, in principle, Pueyrre-
don ' s critique of United States military interventions. At first, they included 
G u a t e m a l a , the Domin ican Repub l i c , Argen t ina , Honduras , Mex ico , El 
Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Haiti, and Panama. The United States, 
Cuba, and Nicaragua backed Maur tua ' s interpretations while Brazil, Chile, 
Uruguay, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Bolivia expressed neutral positions. A 
sub-committee was formed to try to accommodate the opposing viewpoints. It 
failed to do so and as a result, the problem was postponed to discussion at a 
later date. This represented Charles Evans Hughes ' s first diplomatic victory at 
the conference; the former Secretary of State, a member of the conciliatory sub-
committee, worked not to win over other delegates to Maur tua ' s viewpoint, but 
to forestall a consensus in favour of formal codification. For the United States, 
adjournment represented victory. It accomplished the defeat of anti-interven-
tionist sentiment, without the adverse publicity of a drawn-out diplomatic 
confrontation at Havana.27 
In itself, and in light of the open-ended instructions Pueyrredon received in 
the days before the conference began, the Argentine anti-intervention motion 
did not contradict Foreign Ministry instructions, nor did it follow government 
policy. Whether the Argentine delegation chief could have won sufficient 
backing for a codification of anti-intervention remains uncertain; because he 
contradicted Argentine government policy on economic cooperation with the 
United States, Pueyrredon was removed from his conference post. Because 
they forced Pueyrredon's resignation as delegation chief, Argentine authorities 
undercut their nation's leadership role at Havana on the intervention issue. On 
23 January , twelve days be fo re his objec t ion to Uni ted States mil i tary 
interference in Latin America, Pueyrredon directly defied Argentine govern-
ment policy and a history of Argentine support for United States economic 
goals within the Pan American Union. He refused to sign a conference 
convention on the reorganisation of the Pan American Union without the 
inclusion of a preamble critical of high tariff barriers. The United States 
correctly interpreted the refusal as a denunciation of US tariffs. And although 
they responded belatedly, Pueyrredon's superiors refused to allow the tariff 
criticism to stand. 
In his statement on tariffs, Pueyrredon insisted that high trade barriers to 
which he objected constituted an infringement on economic cooperation among 
nation states, an essential component of Pan Americanism. In addit ion, 
Pueyrredon made reference to what he felt had been an arbitrary 1927 sanitary 
ban by the Uni ted Sta tes agains t Argen t ine cat t le ; he ca l led fo r a rule 
guaranteeing that plant or animal quarantines would not be effected arbitrarily. 
Despite the fact that over the preceding year the sanitary ban had been at the 
forefront of Argentine political discussion, United States officials ignored this 
latter feature of Pueyrredon's reproach. The Argentine delegation chief himself 
did not raise the sanitary ban issue again at the conference.28 
More generally, Pueyrredon's attack on high tariffs was poorly conceived. 
Enacted by a Republican-dominated Congress and against the wishes of the 
outgoing Woodrow Wilson administration, the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 
and the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 prompted stormy protests in 
Argentina against prohibitive rates on such vital Argentine exports as wheat, 
corn, wool, meat, sugar, and hides. Before passage of the Emergency Tariff 
Act, of twenty key commodities that comprised 80% of Argentine exports to 
the United States, fifteen entered the United States free of duty. After 1921, 
only two of those items could be imported without a duty charge. Argentine 
criticisms of the United States rates persisted through the 1920s, however the 
government of Marcelo T. de Alvear had no interest in pursuing Pueyrredon's 
tariff-based antagonism; Argentine rates were as high or higher than their US 
equivalents and subject to criticism from other Latin American nations. In 
1926, 31.7% of Argentine imports to the United States entered duty-free while 
only 27.2% of goods from the United States to Argentina were free of tariff 
charges . United States tar iff rates were genera l ly lower than those of 
Argentina, but the average United States rates on imports from Argentina were 
higher than the Argentine rates on shipments f rom the United States - this latter 
statistic was the result of the high US barriers on flaxseed and wool, f rom 
which most of the revenue f rom Argent ine trade with the United States 
29 ' came. 
Pueyrredon resigned, as a result of his conflict with the Argentine govern-
ment over the tariff issue, but not before having merged, by virtue of his 
act ions, two previously independent areas of Argent ine fore ign policy -
economic relations with the United States and a public defence of national self-
determination rights in the Americas. For the Argentine government, alarm 
over Puey r r edon ' s al ienation of the United States on the tariff cr i t icism 
precluded taking the measured diplomatic stand on intervention that Sagarna 
had contemplated; in the final days of the conference, Argentine representatives 
were instructed not to take any actions that might alienate the United States. 
For Washington, concerns over anti-intervention became compounded suddenly 
with what was seen as unprecedented and unexpected Argentine belligerence 
with regard to questions of trade. 
Initially it seemed that the Argentine government would back Pueyrredon 's 
renegade stance. On 24 January, the day after the delegation chief made his 
remarks on tariff walls, the Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires sent Pueyrredon 
a congratulatory telegram. It was not until 10 February that Felipe Espil took 
the unusual step of denouncing his superior to the Argentine Foreign Minis-
try.30 Only after Espi l ' s 10 February communicat ion did President Alvear 
order Pueyrredon to sign the document. A day later, the delegation chief 
answered by brazenly summarising his objections to the US tariffs. He made 
no commitment to signing the conference convention. At this point, the State 
Department was as concerned as Espil with Pueyrredon 's intransigence. But 
on the same day that Espil sent his telegram to Buenos Aires, Ambassador 
R o b e r t W o o d s Bl i ss sa t i s f i ed the Sta te D e p a r t m e n t that the A r g e n t i n e 
government would censure Pueyrredon. The US ambassador learned f rom a 
rel iable source that matters would be ' s t ra ightened out in the Argent ine 
delegat ion ' . Bliss informed Washington that there was no need for the United 
States to ' f o r ce mat ters too s t rong ly ' . Yet P u e y r r e d o n ' s tone remained 
belligerent. He suggested to the Argentine President that his signing the 
convention was out of the question. Having expressed a strong opinion on the 
matter, the delegation chief believed that he could not now reverse his stand. 
Pueyrredon suggested a face-saving compromise to Alvear. The delegation 
chief might reject the document at Havana, but pass it on to the government in 
Buenos Aires for ratification.31 
By 12 February, Pueyrredon had received no further instructions pursuant to 
his latest suggestion. When the press learned of Alvear ' s insistence that 
Pueyrredon back down f rom his attack on the United States, the delegation 
chief sent another telegram to Buenos Aires. He informed the administration 
that Alvear ' s order to sign the document was embarrassing him. Now openly 
insubordinate, Pueyrredon brashly announced that if he did not to receive 
further instructions by noon on 13 February, he would publicly restate his 
insistence on an anti-tariff clause. The Argentine government received the 
telegram the morning of the threatened deadline. Within hours, the Foreign 
Ministry shot back a response, which was delivered to the delegation chief at 
9:40 a.m. The Foreign Ministry instructed Pueyrredon not to attend a meeting 
of the delegates scheduled for that afternoon. Pueyrredon disobeyed and 
at tended the meet ing, reaf f i rming that he would not sign the conference 
document. Later, he informed the Foreign Ministry that its telegram had not 
reached him in time.32 
Foreign Minis ter Ga l la rdo responded on 14 February . He cr i t ic ised 
Pueyrredon for having disobeyed instructions and, in the process, having 
defined an extremist position for Argentina. Gallardo defended Pan American-
ism as well as Pueyrredon ' s concept of a tar i f f - f ree zone in the western 
hemisphere. But he reviled what he sensed was the political intent of his 
subordina te . The State Depar tmen t remained uncer ta in whether or not 
Pueyrredon expressed the views of his government. Bliss suspected correctly 
that the Foreign Ministry had deliberately concealed the full extent of the 
Pueyrredon-Gallardo split. The Argentine authorities were embarrassed at the 
strong views Pueyrredon had issued on behalf of his government . Also, 
Ga l l a rdo did not wish to reveal o ther sens i t ive pol i t ical p rob lems that 
Pueyrredon raised through his statements. Argentine politicians feared that 
their leadership on a non-intervention platform might precipitate negative 
publicity for the federal government 's many interventions in the governing of 
the Argentine provinces since the first presidential administration of Hipolito 
Yrigoyen.33 
In a final effort to convince Pueyrredon not to disrupt Argentine conference 
objectives, Gallardo demonstrated his government 's continued willingness to 
place Argentina at the head of an anti-intervention motion under two conditions 
- the backing of a majority of Latin American delegates and the likelihood of 
the motion being passed. The Foreign Minister responded to Pueyrredon's 
argument that to accept the Pan American Union reorganisation document 
without a statement on high tariffs would constitute unacceptable ambiguity on 
the part of Argentina. On 15 February, Gallardo suggested that it was by not 
taking an extreme position on the issue of tariffs ( 'en no extremar la intransi-
gencia en el asunto arancelario') that the Argentines might then be 'entirely 
intransigent' on foreign interventions. Gallardo recommended that Pueyrredon 
defer the question of the Pan American reorganisation not on the basis of 
tariffs, a proposition on which the Argentines stood alone, but over anti-
intervention for which Argentina could count on considerable support from 
Latin American colleagues. Were the Argentine delegation to follow this 
course, the Foreign Minister pointed out, ' in case of the wors t ' , the Pan 
American Union would appear to fail because of 'North American intransigence 
on the question of intervention and not for Argentine obstinacy on the problem 
of tariffs, of lesser importance'.3 4 
As well as policy logic, the Foreign Minister offered Pueyrredon a face-
saving exit. He urged that the delegation chief adopt a tactic used before at 
international gatherings. Pueyrredon could sign the document while issuing a 
public reservation on the question of international trade. The problem could be 
set aside for a future debate. Pueyrredon remained f irm. Responding to 
Gal lardo 's effort at reconciliation, the delegation chief defended the legitimacy 
of his actions. If the Foreign Ministry objected to his statements, those 
objections should have been explicitly stated when he made his initial speeches 
at the conference.3 5 
Pueyrredon could not back down. To have done so would not only have 
weakened his reputation as a diplomat, but would have jeopardised political 
ambitions he held. He refused to sign the convention and resigned both as 
de lega t ion chief and A m b a s s a d o r to the Uni ted States . In the hope of 
maintaining an image of government unity, Alvear rejected the resignation and 
now authorised Pueyrredon to withhold his signature f rom the reorganisation 
document; the Argentine government could approve the convention at a later 
date, as Pueyrredon had proposed before. On 16 February, Pueyrredon advised 
the Foreign Ministry that his resignation would stand. He insisted, in his 
formal communication, that the question was not simply one of his personal 
standing, but of how the Argentine government perceived Pan Americanism. 
Pueyrredon argued that his stance was based on an understanding that the 
hemisphere 's economic problems must take precedence in Pan Americanism. 
His resignation derived f rom Alvear ' s failure to concur. Pueyrredon forced his 
government ' s hand by leaking details of his resignation to the press. This time, 
the government accepted his departure. 
Only twenty- four hours af ter Gal lardo had suggested that Pueyr redon 
abandon tariffs in favour of anti-intervention, as a point of principle, and on the 
day Pueyr redon res igned, de legate Olascoaga not i f ied Gal la rdo that his 
conference colleagues on the Committee of Public International Law had not 
been able to reach agreement on anti-intervention. They had begun to discuss 
the suggestion that the problem be postponed to a future conference. Olascoaga 
asked the Foreign Minister whether the Argentine delegation should accept the 
deferment. Gallardo replied that Olascoaga was to make Argent ina 's objections 
to intervention known in a brief statement, but 4 if the majority resolve to 
postpone the issue to the next conference you are to submit to the majority 
resolution' . With the Alvear administration preoccupied over Pueyrredon 's 
misrepresentation of Argent ina 's policy on US tariffs, and with Pueyrredon 's 
dispute with his government exposed in the international press, Argent ina 's 
conference leadership collapsed; the opportunity for an Argentine-directed anti-
intervention challenge was lost.36 
Once Pueyrredon resigned, the Argentine delegation acquiesced to United 
States foreign policy objectives. On the questions of commercial arbitration, 
the creation of facilities for international money orders, the regulation of 
hydraulic power, and other problems in the normalisation of trade and finance, 
the Argentine Foreign Ministry simply instructed its delegates to 'keep in mind ' 
international agreements which might take precedence over a Pan American 
document. Otherwise, Felipe Espil and his colleagues were to maintain the 
supportive stance originally promised to Washington. Argentina backed pre-set 
discussion on a variety of trade and finance propositions, including international 
automobile traffic, the establishment of international shipping lines, and the 
exchange of scientific information. Delegates passed resolutions on several 
impor t an t t r ade - re l a t ed t hemes inc lud ing the convoca t i on of a specia l 
conference to study the problems of trademark protection, on the simplification 
of consular procedure, and for the construction of a Pan American highway. 
Diplomats present adopted and signed a convention regulating serial navigation, 
and resolutions forecasting the completion of the Pan American Railway - two 
thirds of which had been constructed already, and which when completed would 
connect New York and all other cities of the United States with Buenos Aires 
and Santiago.37 
The threat to US authority at Havana, however, did not end with Pueyr-
redon 's departure. Delegates to the Committee on Public International Law had 
agreed to pos tpone the quest ion of ant i - intervent ion to the Seventh Pan 
American Conference. But when, on 18 February, the issue came up for 
confirmation during the final plenary session, the new Argentine delegation 
leader, Laurentino Olascoaga, introduced a resolution expressing the regret of 
his Government that the conference had not been able to accomplish anything 
on the topic of intervention.38 A number of other delegates went through the 
same formality and finally all delegations, including that of the United States, 
expressed their regret that no solution had been found on the matter. The 
Guatemalan delegate, Alvarado Tello, then moved the conference to a revival 
of the anti-intervention conflict by formally asking the Committee on Public 
International Law why it had been unable to propose a solution when it seemed 
all delegates were 'in agreement ' on the issue. In fact, the delegates agreed 
only on their expression of regret. Nevertheless, the Guatemalan 's interjection 
allowed Gustavo Guerrero another opportunity to criticise US policy in Central 
Amer ica . He proposed that the confe rence go on record as opposed to 
intervention.39 
During this final important gathering of the conference, in the midst of a 
torrent of anti-US cat-calls f rom the press gallery, Hughes drew on the support 
Kellogg had garnered in late 1927. The US delegates benefited from a curious 
break in proceedings; immediately following Guerrero 's interjection, Cuban 
university dignitaries entered the hall to deliver official closing speeches for the 
conference. As the speeches were delivered, Hughes approached allies among 
the Latin American delegates. He told Raul Fernandes of Brazil and Enrique 
Olaya Herrera of Colombia that he could not 'be put in the position of stopping 
discussion on the mat ter ' . He sent word to the Cuban conference chair, 
Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, that on no account should the session be 
adjourned until the matter were resolved favourably for the United States. 
Once the university off icials had left the hall, Hughes ' s Latin American 
supporters responded to Guerrero. Fernandes made a speech critical of the 
Salvadoran and was supported by the Colombian and Costa Rican delegations. 
Understanding that his own commentary would be necessary to quell this final 
challenge, Hughes then rose to defend the Latin America policies of the United 
States after which he was applauded loudly from the floor. Guerrero withdrew 
his proposal . Before the commi t t ee ' s report postponing the intervention 
problem was adopted unanimously, Victor Maurtua reassumed his defence of 
US interests. In a fiery speech he charged Guerrero with coming to Havana to 
play politics, and to bring about disorder, disorganisation, and ' jungle life' .4 0 
Long prior to this last anti-intervention discussion at Havana, Felipe Espil 
emerged as a key conference leader, guiding the crucial sixth committee, 
charged with economic problems. Delegates also assigned Espil to study 
methods for the implementation of trade mark rules. Conference minutes 
described Espil 's report to the delegates as 'bri l l iant ' . A devoted exponent of 
uniformity in trade and finance, Espil proved an ardent supporter of the US 
goal of commercial normalisation. At Havana, he chastised his colleagues for 
not having reached an accord on the uniformity of trade mark rules before 
1928. Earlier resolutions for such regulations had been ratified by only a few 
member nations. Part of the problem, according to Espil, was that the Pan 
American conferences were not the ideal media for this kind of discussion. 
Real progress could only be achieved, he advocated, at more specialised 
international meetings. Espil called for regular Pan American reunions on 
pa r t i cu la r obs tac les to t rade and f inance . 4 1 He iden t i f i ed with the US 
characterisat ion of Pan Americanism as a vehicle for greater commercia l 
stability. This accounted for the disdain he showed towards Pueyrredon's 
demagogy. Espil believed that the United States object ive of protect ing 
industrial property through tariffs would benefit all nations of the hemisphere. 
Regulation would provide security for both consumers and producers, thereby 
allowing for economic growth on a US model. Delegates to the Sixth Pan 
American Conference eventually drafted and signed eleven conventions, sixty-
two resolutions, seven motions, and four agreements; the vast majority of these 
dictated and modified rules of trade and finance among participatory states. 
After Pueyrredon 's departure, Argentina proved a staunch supporter of United 
States economic policy at the gathering.42 
In the f ina l days of the Sixth Pan A m e r i c a n C o n f e r e n c e , with Espi l 
manoeuvring a realignment of the Argentine position to conform with past 
adherence to United States economic policy, Pueyrredon attempted to reaffirm 
his past diplomatic relations with the State Department. Having returned to 
Washington, Pueyrredon visited Secretary Kellogg to insist that his comments 
on high tariffs in the hemisphere had not been directed at the United States. 
Angered by the Argentinian 's attempt to deny the forcefulness of his Havana 
attack, Kellogg lectured Pueyrredon on the US tariff position. He admonished 
Pueyrredon that United States duties were no more prohibitive than other such 
barriers in the hemisphere. There was a greater percentage of goods coming 
into the United States f ree of duty f r o m Latin Amer ica than vice versa. 
Pueyrredon apparently concurred without argument. His passive acceptance of 
Kellogg's argument only weeks after the inflammatory conference comments 
evoked a testy response from the Secretary of State. Kellogg recorded that as 
the Argentine Ambassador 'opened up the subject, I made up my mind that I 
could not afford to have him think that I did not resent his attitude'. While the 
Secretary sat fuming, Pueyrredon persisted in discussing his own political 
prospects.43 
Having enraged Kellogg, Pueyrredon continued to alienate Foreign Minister 
Gallardo and other Argentine leaders. In early April, while in Rio de Janeiro, 
he announced that the ideas he propounded at Havana would succeed 'some 
day ' . Pueyrredon complained that his fe l low delegates and the Foreign 
Ministry had undermined his position at the conference. As such, they had 
made the nation vulnerable in a time of emergency. Pueyrredon falsely accused 
the government of conspiring with US delegates against his own position. At 
Montevideo, he denied having made the Rio de Janeiro comments and thanked 
United States government officials for their 'open-mindedness ' towards his 
position. He intimated that high-ranking US leaders had admired the courage 
of his stand, if not the content of his message. Pueyrredon claimed to be on 
good terms with the United States government . He reported that former 
president William Howard Taft had 'applauded' his attitude. Pueyrredon's 
persistent dishonesty contributed to continued US doubts about the Argentine 
government position. Bliss was never fully convinced that Alvear had not 
supported, at least in part, his Havana delegation chief.44 
In the months following the Havana Conference, the United States sought to 
establish precisely what Pueyrredon had said in Cuba on the subject of anti-
intervention. The State Department wished to ensure that he would not be able 
to mask his commentary at a future date. As late as August 1928, Francis 
White was pursuing Pueyrredon's precise words on anti-intervention. Having 
finally ascertained this information to his satisfaction, White commented to 
former US delegate to Santiago and Havana, Henry P. Fletcher, that '[s]hould 
Pueyrredon bring up this question any more, I think we can put him very 
definitely in his place once and for a l l \ Before, during, and after the Sixth Pan 
American Conference, the United States authorities succeeded in exercising a 
domineering diplomatic control over the threat to US military and economic 
interests in Central America. Furthermore, by coordinating that control with 
widespread Latin American support for a determined US agenda of trade and 
finance objectives, the United States succeeded in crafting a new, though short-
lived Pan American order in which the Pan American Union functioned to 
defuse controversial political debate and to further United States economic 
interests.45 
IV - Perspectives on the Argentine Challenge 
The an t i - in te rven t ion cha l l enge re f lec ted ear l ier example s of Argen t ine 
diplomatic leadership, most notably, Hipolito Yrigoyen 's 1917 attempt to rally 
a Latin American bloc of neutrals that would challenge US wartime leadership. 
At Havana, the Argentine Foreign Ministry intended to reassert Argentine 
diplomatic leadership in Latin America . When, on 13 January, Antonio 
Sagarna cabled instructions that Pueyrredon express Argentine concerns over 
intervention, the revised Argentine conference position was released to the 
press. This information was meant for international as well as domest ic 
consumption. On 22 January, the Argentine ambassador to Chile, Manuel 
Malbran, informed Sagarna that the news had produced a strong impression in 
political circles and among diplomatic colleagues in Santiago: ' la cancilleria 
argentina ha exteriorizado una vez mas las tradiciones de nuestra politica 
internacional de respeto a la libre determinacion e independencia de los pueblos 
americanos. '4 6 
Yet, the public Argentine grievance on tariffs was anomalous in a context of 
extensive cooperation between Argentina and the United States, in matters of 
Pan American economic policy, through the 1910s and 1920s. The fusion of 
the two issues by Pueyrredon culminated in a confrontation that was unprece-
dented in the history of Argentine-United States relations. Furthermore, despite 
the fact that anti-intervention became an accepted precept at the Seventh Pan 
American Conference in 1933, no evidence ties Argentina 's conference role in 
that year with Pueyrredon's anti-intervention motion (revoked by the Argentine 
government after Pueyrredon's resignation) in 1928.47 
In equating Pueyrredon 's stand with that of the 'Argentine government ' , 
various authors (most recently, Luis Alen Lascano and Richard V. Salisbury) 
have argued that Argentine-United States economic conflicts before 1928, over 
high US tariffs and United States sanitary restrictions against Argentine beef 
imports, conditioned the 'Argent ine ' challenge at Havana. The longterm and 
close cooperation of Argentine officials (both within the Pan American Union 
s t ructure and in other venues) with US economic ob jec t ives bel ies this 
contention.48 In addition, no documentary evidence supports the assertion that 
economic mot iva t ions guided ei ther gove rnmen t pol icy or P u e y r r e d o n ' s 
personal actions. On the contrary, several factors suggest that there was no 
political consensus for action on these questions, either inside or outside the 
Alvear administration. Even though Argentine authorities had criticised high 
United States tariff barriers since the early 1920s, and continued to petition the 
United States for reduction on the rates for corn, linseed, and other products, 
the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Sir Malcolm Robertson, understood 
that Pueyrredon 's statement on tariffs was 'strangely shortsighted' , in light of 
A r g e n t i n a ' s t rade barr iers , which were high by in terna t ional s tandards . 
Pueyrredon 's position on tariffs seemed 'shortsighted ' as economic policy, but 
not as a personal political tactic that capitalised on a popular anti-imperial 
mood in Buenos Aires.49 
In late 1926 and 1927, with the promulgation of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture 's Bureau of Animal Industry Order (BAI) 298, banning the 
importation of chilled and frozen cattle from Argentina, the Argentine Rural 
Society led a vigorous attack against Washington in Congress, in the press, and 
in other circles. Propounding the slogan 'Buy from those who buy from us ' , 
the Rural Society accused the United States of dishonestly implementing a trade 
barrier in the guise of a sanitary ban (against Foot-and-mouth disease). At first, 
the Argentine government reacted favourably to the Rural Society accusations 
and defended the high quality of Argentine cattle. By the time of the Havana 
Conference, however, and subsequently, a number of important public voices 
in Argentina began to question the position of the Rural Society and insisted 
that no retaliatory action against the United States was warranted. These 
included the national Pork Raisers ' Association and many provincial and local 
rural societies which felt embittered that their interests had not been represented 
by the national Rural Society, which was intent on concealing the extent of 
Foot-and-mouth disease in the country. By early 1929, under pressure from the 
Argentine Industrial Union (representing manufacturers) and other groups, the 
Rural Society relented in its antagonism towards the United States. Despite the 
fact that Pueyrredon, as a member of an important landowning family, had 
strong personal ties to the Rural Society, neither he nor any of the Argentine 
delegation members reached Havana with the intent to retaliate against BAI 
Order 298.50 
The attack on United States policy at the Sixth Pan American Conference did 
not represent the first public occasion on which the delegation chief had staged 
a bold and iconoclastic diplomatic incident. In December 1920, as the leader 
of Argentina 's first delegation to the League of Nations, Pueyrredon walked out 
of that body 's meetings when the United States refused Argentina 's petition for 
full League membership for all nations. Yet, while in 1920 Pueyrredon 
expressed the political will of President Hipolito Yrigoyen, eight years later he 
took his stand alone. Pueyrredon's independence of action in 1928 accents an 
important difference between the diplomacy of the United States and that of 
Argentina. During the first years of the twentieth century, in response to 
congressional pressures and the growing importance of trade and political 
contacts abroad, the United States Department of State initiated a programme 
to depoliticise and professionalise the nation's diplomatic corps. By 1928, the 
insubordination inherent in Pueyrredon's conduct was foreign to the United 
States diplomatic corps. Furthermore, Pueyrredon's maverick delivery was in 
keeping with a long history of Argentine political power and policy-making 
authority residing in the London and Washington ambassadorships, a context 
for which there was no equivalent in the United States. Romulo S. Naon, 
A m b a s s a d o r to the Uni ted States in the 1910s, and T o m a s Le Bre ton , 
Ambassador to Great Britain in the 1940s, were among several to demonstrate 
that Argentine mission heads in these capitals often initiated policy, beyond 
specific directives.51 
These factors delineate a backdrop to Pueyrredon 's principal motivation in 
committ ing Argentina to anti-intervention and an attack on high tariffs. His 
conference tacks represented a personal political agenda designed to alienate 
the Alvear administration and to create an opportunity for his reentry into the 
cabinet of a new Yrigoyen-led regime. Angel Gallardo, former Ambassador to 
the United States Tomas Le Breton, and President Alvear, were among many 
Argentinians who suspected at the time that Pueyrredon 's motivation in defying 
his government had nothing to do with his antipathy to US imperialism, but 
rather to a careful calculation that former President Yrigoyen would be returned 
to presidential off ice later that year. In early 1928, despite the fact that 
Yrigoyen had not declared his candidacy for the general elections scheduled for 
April (and would not do so until a week before the vote), many Argentinians 
began to anticipate that the former president would win a strong majority. 
Yrigoyen, true to his popular designation, 'elpeludo' (the armadillo), made no 
speeches, no utterances of policy, and no statements of intent until the final 
stage of the campaign, when he let it be known, in a much-publicised letter to 
a good will organisation, that if elected president he would donate his salary to 
charity.52 
Compell ing evidence of a coming Yrigoyen victory surfaced during the 
Havana conference; gubernatorial elections in the provinces of Tucuman and 
Entre Rfos convinced many sceptics of el peludo's impending return to office. 
Reports of these elections, wrote Sir Malcolm Robertson, 'have given such an 
overwhelming majority to the candidates of the Irigoyenist party ' that the 
opposition forces 'are in a state of complete despair ' . 'These two elect ions ' , 
the British Ambassador went on, 'are so strongly indicative of the way that the 
political wind is blowing that I cannot now find anyone who has the smallest 
hope of Irigoyen being defeated in Apri l ' . Pueyrredon was one of those who 
understood the implications of the Tucuman and Entre Rios elections. He 
anticipated correctly that Yrigoyen would win the presidential election of 1928. 
Having served in Yrigoyen 's cabinet during the 1910s, Pueyrredon hoped to 
return to a high post in the new government, and said as much to Sir Esme 
Howard, the British Ambassador to the United States.53 
While , on his brief sojourn to Washing ton af ter the Havana meet ing, 
P u e y r r e d o n tried to assuage angry State Depa r tmen t admin i s t ra to r s , he 
approached the British embassy with a different analysis of Argent ina 's foreign 
relations. The United States, Pueyrredon complained, was beginning to look 
on South America too much as a private preserve. It was almost certain, 
Pueyrredon continued, that Yrigoyen - a ' f r iend ' of British interests - would 
be elected President at the coming elections and in this event he, Pueyrredon, 
would 'probably be appointed Minister of Foreign Affa i rs ' . Speaking already 
in his expected cabinet-level capacity, Pueyrredon said that he intended to 
promote economic relations with Great Britain and with other European states 
to offset 'United States penetration' .5 4 
At Havana, Pueyrredon found an opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty to 
Yrigoyen. By combining the Foreign Ministry 's ambiguous directives on 
intervention with his own stand on tariffs, Pueyrredon identified the means of 
demonstrating adherence to Yrigoyen 's political venture. Unlike Alvear, whose 
popular image was that of a weak president,55 Yrigoyen expressed a vocifer-
ously anti-interventionist and anti-imperial political message in 1928. By 
assuming an anti-US posture, Pueyrredon hoped to demonstrate a worldview 
similar to that of Yrigoyen. Perhaps more important, Pueyrredon probably 
expected that his coup against the Alvear administration would indicate to 
Yrigoyen that Pueyrredon exercised power within the Argentine polity, and was 
therefore a valuable poli t ical ally. Fur thermore , in chal lenging Alvear , 
Yrigoyen's long-term political adversary, Pueyrredon hoped to indicate his 
allegiance to the former President, while publicly breaking ties with the current 
chief executive.56 
More surprising than the delayed response of Espil to Pueyrredon's betrayal 
of his mandate was the failure of the Foreign Ministry to react to the delegation 
chief until af ter Espi l ' s warning telegram of 10 February. As late as 8 
February, Gallardo suggested to Sir Malcolm Robertson that he was 'rather 
proud' of the Argentine delegation chief. It is possible that Gallardo's own 
political allegiances were mixed; in the February political tumult that followed 
the Yrigoyenist political victories in provincial elections, the Buenos Aires 
weekly Caras y Caretas int imated that the Foreign Minister might back 
Yrigoyen in the coming contest. Moreover, in the lead-up to the conference 
and at the time Pueyrredon made his inflammatory remarks, Gallardo was 
preoccupied with a long visit to Europe, which began in December and from 
which he did not return until after the conference began. Editors of the Review 
of the River Plate could not explain what affairs of state Gallardo intended to 
conduct in Europe. The 'original, ostensible ' motive of the tour had been to 
assist at the unveiling of a monument to General Belgrano at Genoa. But 
beyond this, and while the crucial final instructions to Havana conference 
delegates had been left in the hands of Antonio Sagarna, Gallardo's chief 
European objective seemed ceremonial. His itinerary highlighted an audience 
with the King of Italy, a luncheon at Buckingham Palace, and meetings with 
various heads of state.57 
That the Havana Conference took place during the traditional Argentine 
summer vacat ion probably cont r ibuted to the le thargy of the Argent ine 
government reaction. Through January 1928, the press sharply criticised 
Alvear for spending too much time at the summer resort of Mar del Plata and 
too little time attending to the affairs of state. It would have been inconceiv-
able for the United States Department of State to have delegated the issuance 
of final conference instructions to one of Ke l logg ' s subordinates; at the 
Argentine Foreign Ministry, Acting Secretary Antonio Sagarna sent out final 
instructions to Pueyrredon while both Gallardo and Alvear remained away from 
Buenos Aires. It seems certain that neither Alvear nor Gallardo suspected 
Pueyrredon's duplicitous intent. There was no Argentine precedent for so 
openly rebellious a stand on the part of a diplomat, and until Espil 's telegram, 
Gallardo and Alvear gave no indication that they mistrusted Pueyrredon. When 
Alvear finally realised the extent of Pueyrredon 's defiance, he reacted bitterly: 
'What do you think of this ambassador! ' the President declared angrily to 
Gallardo. Pueyrredon was trying to ' f ind a pretext to resign, in order to 
ingratiate himself with Irigoyen' . Alvear countered angrily that he would not 
'give him the pleasure ' , explaining, in part, the government ' s initial reluctance 
to accept Pueyrredon 's resignation.58 
The political cynicism that drove Pueyrredon 's Havana challenge is revealed 
in his fr iendly attitude towards the United States in the year prior to the 
conference. Only months before the meeting, the Ambassador had taken a long 
au tomob i l e tr ip through the Uni ted States . He had pub l i shed his very 
favourable impressions of the United States in several newspapers, lauding such 
diverse e lements of Amer ican society as grain elevators , national parks, 
highways, and workers ' living standards. In a tone vastly different f rom his 
interjections at the Havana Conference, Pueyrredon had written, 
In looking into the life of this country one appreciates the intelligent 
energy with which it is gifted and the spirit of renovation in all its 
progress , shown by a constant product ive action which incorporates 
methods and means of ever increasing advancement and employs its 
capital in every useful enterprise which promises any possibility of suc-
cess. 
At Havana, Pueyrredon did not prove a consistent opponent of the United 
States on all issues relating to US imperialism, further underlining the careful 
and political nature of his choice of antagonistic topics. More to the point, 
when he took the side of the United States, he can be said to have represented 
firmly the position of the Alvear government. In the reprise of a matter studied 
in 1923, at the Fifth Conference of American States in Santiago de Chile, the 
Mexican delegation entered a motion that the off ices of Chairman and Director-
General of the Pan American Union, currently held by US citisens, should be 
rotated annually and alphabetically among the twenty-one member nations. 
Also , the Mex icans asked that Lat in Amer i can count r ies send ' s p e c i a l ' 
d e l e g a t i o n s to t he P a n A m e r i c a n U n i o n i n t i m a t i n g t h a t t he c u r r e n t 
representatives, the diplomats assigned to the United States, were under US 
influence. Hughes argued against the motion. He noted that the Pan American 
Union Constitution did not prohibit member states f rom sending whomever they 
wished to represent their interests, and that the off ice of chairman, consistently 
occupied by a representative of the United States, was no more than a post of 
honour. Hughes was backed successfully by Honorio Pueyrredon who led a 
number of Latin American delegates in supporting the continued chairmanship 
of the body by the United States.60 
In a related instance, and in specific reference to US military interventions 
in the Caribbean basin, the Mexicans asked the conference to adopt a motion 
by which, when a revolut ionary group seized the port of an established 
government , member nations would cease to trade through the occupied 
harbour. Mexico received its only support, for parochial reasons, f rom El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. Pueyrredon, representing his government in no 
uncertain terms, led a successful rejection of the proposal. During 1927, in 
even stronger contrast to his anti-intervention stance at Havana, Pueyrredon 
demonstrated sympathy for the mounting turmoil faced by the US government 
in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1920s, Argentina had expressed sympathy for 
Central American nations under US domination, but had never taken a firm 
stand against United States military intervention. In late 1926, the Argentine 
minister in San Jose, Costa Rica, Atilio Daniel Barilari, supplied the Foreign 
Ministry with damning and explicit details of the US military intervention in 
Nicaragua. But in 1927, when Nicaraguan rebel leader Juan B. Sacasa 
approached Barilari for Argentine support in mediating the Nicaraguan crisis, 
Barilari refused. While offering Sacasa assurances of his assistance, Barilari 
counselled Angel Gallardo against an Argentine mediation role; despite the 
blatant injustice of US intervention, Barilari advised, the Argentine government 
had nothing to gain in leading a diplomatic challenge against the United States. 
Barilari noted that with Sacasa 's rebels only 90 miles f rom Managua, an 
important battle was imminent. With uncertain prospects for Nicaragua's 
political future, Argentine leaders would be wise to avoid backing one side or 
the other. Gallardo concurred. Argentina offered Sacasa nothing more than 
moral support.61 
Yet, also in 1927, a year before his Havana challenge to US authority, 
Pueyrredon offered to mediate the Nicaraguan controversy in his capacity of 
Argentine Ambassador in Washington, and in a manner conducive to United 
States interests. 
Pueyrredon understood the need for ambiguity in mediation, on the part of 
the the United States, and was pointedly vague in his approach. He offered 
Kellogg an Argentine mediation that could be entirely non-binding, and applied 
at the discretion of the Department of State. His country 's mediators would act 
neither as judges nor as arbitrators. They would take 'friendly action' to arrive 
at a satisfactory solution - precisely the ill-defined terms the United States 
might consider as a basis for negotiation. Kellogg politely refused the offer, 
with the qualification that if the need arose, he would certainly call on the 
Argentines. Yet, the Secretary of State did accept the overture as 'p roof ' of 
Argentine friendship and the laudable Argentine determination to maintain good 
relations among the nations of the Americas. The Argentine Ambassador had 
won a small diplomatic triumph; 'I can assure your Excellency' , Pueyrredon 
wrote to Gallardo, ' that this message [the proposal to Kellogg] has produced 
an excellent impression' . Only weeks later, Sacasa met personally with Barilari 
in Costa Rica. Barilari 's counsel to the Foreign Ministry remained the same: 
Argen t ina would gain m a x i m u m advan tage by a l lowing the conf l i c t in 
Nicaragua to run its course, before declaring in favour of one faction or 
another.62 
In his 10 February telegram to Gallardo and Alvear, Felipe Espil revealed to 
his government what Pueyrredon 's Nicaragua-related contact with Kellogg also 
indicated - the calculating politics inherent to Pueyrredon 's actions. But after 
the conference , Espil made even more far-reaching cri t icisms of the Pan 
American structure. Pan Americanism, Espil wrote, had no 'natural base ' to 
just i fy its existence. In a familiar Argentine refrain, Espil believed that the 
Argentine affinity for Europe took precedence over any allegiances Argentina 
o w e d o the r Lat in A m e r i c a n s ta tes . The g e o g r a p h i c a l de l im i t a t i on f o r 
membership in the Pan American Union was deceiving. Argentina was much 
closer to Europe or to the United States than to Caracas or Bogota in terms of 
travel time, extent of trade, and the European composition of the Argentine 
population. Espil cited one of Argent ina 's first leaders, Bernardino Rivadavia, 
as the authority for his statements. For similar reasons, according to Espil, 
Rivadavia had refused to participate in the first inter-American conference, 
organised by Simon Bolivar.63 
E s p i l ' s d i s i l lus ionment went fu r the r than his d is tas te for i den t i fy ing 
Argentina with its less developed Latin American neighbours. The diplomat 
had supported staunchly the US objective of commercial normalisation. His 
contempt for Pueyrredon's attacks on the United States had been based, in part, 
on a concern that the delegation chief was upsetting the commercially-oriented 
Pan American structure. Now, less than a month after the Havana Conference, 
Espil expressed his displeasure with the ambiguities of the Pan American 
movement . He was sceptical of much the delegates had achieved, and he 
criticised the document Pueyrredon had refused to sign for the reorganisation 
of the Pan American Union: 
It is curious to note, that it did not occur to anybody to question what 
motives of necessity, urgency or convenience, made it preferable to 
exchange the [former] convenient, in a sense informal system.... for the 
more formal and less elastic system which now results in a Convention.6 4 
Espil was troubled at his own complici ty in the ambiguity of the Pan 
Amer ican U n i o n ' s pro jec ts . The new regula t ions were conce ived more 
formally than those they replaced. But there was little functional difference. 
Espil complained that, for the small changes accepted, the conference might 
have addressed the issue under less auspicious circumstances than as a main 
article of conference discussion. The Counsellor deplored that more energy had 
not been spent resolving precise economic problems. 
Espil grasped the inefficacy of economic progress in Pan Americanism. A 
s taunch suppor te r of US goals of t rade and f inanc ia l normal i sa t ion , he 
ident i f ied the Pan Amer ican U n i o n ' s inabil i ty to address speci f ic Lat in 
American problems, but seemed not to gather that the United States had no 
interest in pursu ing these concerns . Wash ing ton suppor ted genera l i sed 
regulations facilitating international trade. But were the Pan American Union 
to consider the detailed problems of particular nations, the organisation might 
be transformed into a medium through which member states could press the 
United States on its trade policy, an unacceptable scenario for US planners. 
Surprisingly, after precipitating his superior 's ouster f rom office, Espil 
criticised Pueyrredon for the weakness of the preamble the latter had fought to 
include in the Pan American document. After Havana, Espil told the Foreign 
Ministry that Pueyrredon's preamble had not gone far enough in calling for a 
significant economic reorganisation. In the half-heartedness of its attack on 
United States tariffs (and as a function of Pueyrredon's political motivations), 
it had conformed to, rather than confronted, the limited scope of Pan American 
trade and finance projects. The proposed insertion was impractical and could 
only have had a symbolic impact. Espil wanted problems of Latin American 
development to be confronted on a point-by-point basis at conferences with 
strict economic orientations. 
On the delegates ' decision to postpone a consideration of military interven-
tion, Espil again reflected his country 's non-confrontational approach to US 
hegemony. He understood that the codification of international law had been 
discussed at Havana without the practical criteria needed to effect a solution to 
the problem. The diplomat had no doubt that even if Maurtua 's opponents had 
realised a formal codification of the rules of international conduct, the Pan 
American Union could offer no practical medium for their implementation. 
Espil could suggest no alternative course of action for that which had been 
taken. It must not have escaped the delegates ' attention, Espil noted, that the 
Monroe Doctrine was the basis for United States military interventions. This 
cornerstone of US policy was a unilateral declaration, on whose interpretation 
'the United States had declared themselves the only judges ' and to which the 
question of non-intervention would be 'intimately related' . Although one of the 
most prominent participants in the United States-dominated Pan American 
order, consolidated in 1928, Espil seemed not fully appreciative of the manner 
in which the United States had structured the Union. 
V - Conclusion: Consolidating Control 
Espil 's ingenuous remarks on United States control within the Pan American 
Union, and his articulation of US economic interests within the Pan American 
order, represent both the ascendancy of the United States within the inter-
American body and the accompanying growth of US commercial and financial 
activities in Argentina and elsewhere in South America.65 Havana marked the 
beginning of a short-lived crest in United States influence within the Pan 
American Union, representative of US economic strength - and interrupted by 
the Great Depression. At the Sixth Conference, both the United States and 
Argentine governments followed agendas in keeping with those their diplomats 
had articulated at earlier Pan American meetings. Increasingly, after the First 
Meeting of the American States in 1889, US officials had come to view the Pan 
Amer ican Union as a fo rum through which avenues of commerc ia l and 
financial opportunity could be opened, in association with expanding United 
States economic interests in Latin America.6 6 From a rigorous pursuit of 
Latin American trade opportunities in 1910, at the Fourth Conference in Buenos 
Aires, US officials acted after 1915 to control financial and investment policies 
in the hemisphere through agreements at Pan American financial meetings.67 
In 1923, at the Fifth Conference of American States (the Santiago Confer-
ence), the United States began to coordinate two features of its Pan American 
policy that would emerge as crucial to the defeat of anti-interventionism at the 
Havana Conference five years later - the centrality of economic objectives and 
the importance of diplomatic control. On the eve of the Santiago meeting, 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes enjoined US delegates to stress 
p r o b l e m s of commerc ia l and f inanc ia l normal i sa t ion . 6 8 To ach ieve the 
unhindered implementation of the US conference agenda,69 Hughes inaugur-
ated undemocratic controlling tactics, that would be applied successfully in 
1928, and again at future gatherings (including the wartime First and Second 
Meetings of hemispheric Foreign Ministers in 1939 and 1940, and at the 1954 
Caracas Conference). Hughes insisted that conference discussion not vary f rom 
an immutable conference agenda, and remain free of controversial topics.70 
Though to an extent more limited than US tactics before Havana, Hughes 
engineered a diplomat ic o f fens ive to secure Latin Amer ican support for 
Washington ' s conference objectives. In addition, he voiced a concern that 
would trouble both him and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg five years later 
at the Havana Conference: United States authorities did not wish criticisms of 
American expansionism to be aired at the conference.71 
Unlike US officials, Argentine government delegates reached the Santiago 
and Havana Conferences without the tradition of a determined Pan American 
policy, cogent economic objectives for the hemisphere, or clear conference 
goals. At the 1910 Buenos Aires Conference, the Argentine government 
admitted that the United States had led in the preparation and execution of the 
con fe rence agenda . As Wash ing ton domina ted Pan Amer ican f inancia l 
meetings after 1915, Argentine authorities failed to articulate a distinct financial 
policy, apart f rom the goal of securing private US bank loans.72 While US 
diplomacy at Santiago centred on restricting discussion to trade- and finance-
related themes, the Argentine government approached the Fifth Conference 
without an independent, substantive plan to place before the delegates. Faced 
with failed postwar prospects for beef markets in Europe, a mounting foreign 
debt, and the restrictions of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff in the United States, 
Argentine leaders hoped that economic development lay in stronger commercial 
and financial ties with the United States and other industrialised countries. The 
Argentines accepted the United States Pan American model for economic 
development, stressing commercial normalisation and financial stability. Where 
the Argentine government planned to introduce variants in the predetermined 
agenda, delegates were instructed not to question US objectives, but merely to 
propose ad jus tments in details. Argent ina explici t ly supported most US 
projects at the meeting.73 
This support, at Santiago and Havana, reflects rising economic ties between 
Argentina and the United States during the 1920s. Between 1910 and 1928, as 
Washington 's primacy defined a new Pan American order, the expansion of 
United States trade and financial interests in Argentina paralleled equivalent US 
expansion elsewhere in South America. Many Argentine leaders believed that 
their nation's prosperity would be tied to the continued growth of bilateral trade 
links with the United States. During the first three decades of the century, to 
be sure, British economic influence in Argentina remained stronger than that 
of the United States. But the percentage of direct US overseas investment in 
Argentina - and in South America generally - increased steadily. The 1920s 
witnessed the first notable flow of US capital investment into Argentina. By 
1924, US investment in Argentine industry reached almost $100 million. In 
1928 and 1929 alone, the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation 
and the American and Foreign Power Company sent nearly $160 million to 
Argentina. And by 1930, direct US investment in Argentina, some $335 
million, was third in Latin America to the amounts invested in Cuba and 
Mexico.74 
Whereas in 1913 Argentina 's share of United States direct investment in 
Latin America was only 3%, by 1929 this figure had risen to 11%. Brazil 
experienced a similar increase, f rom 4% to 9%, and in Chile, the equivalent 
statistics are 1% to 7%. For 1929, the value of Argentine exports to the United 
States represented twice that for 1921 and four times that for 1913. More 
significantly, the nature of US economic penetration abroad became more 
multi-faceted. Portfolio investment (by which investors financed the operation 
of a firm without assuming a controlling interest) changed the manner in which 
US policy-makers viewed economic opportunity in the Southern Cone, as did 
new legislation in the 1910s that opened new foreign opportunities for United 
States banks.75 
As the First World War approached, Argentina was selling increasingly to 
the British (the traditionally dominant foreign power in the River Plate region) 
and buying progressively more from the United States. The war set a telling 
precedent for the decline in British influence: Argentina made its first large-
scale loans to England so that the British could continue to buy agricultural 
produce. Great Britain's heightening balance-of-trade deficit with Argentina 
was reinforced after the war as a rapid escalation in private US loans to the 
Argentine government replaced earlier British financing. In the meat-packing 
indust ry , A r g e n t i n a ' s most vital sector , Uni ted States compan ies made 
tremendous inroads. Almost immediately after 1907-1909, when Swift & 
Company of Chicago and other US houses acquired Argentine packing plants, 
these American firms began to assert dominance over the industry. By 1910, 
American packing house output in Argentina claimed a major share of the 
British market, at the expense of beef packed by British and Argentine houses. 
At the outbreak of the First World War, American companies controlled 
41 .35% of beef exports . The Brit ish mainta ined a 40 .15% share while 
Argentine houses were left with only 18.5%. US houses maintained a high 
percentage of beef exports through the 1920s.76 
In 1925, the United States became the principal supplier of foreign goods to 
Argentina, surpassing the once predominant British and by the time of the 
Havana gathering, the International Harvester Company and other United States 
f i rms supplied more than 95% of Argent ina 's agricultural machinery. Packards, 
Fords, and other North American vehicles prevailed on Argent ina 's burgeoning 
road network and many feared that this sector of United States exports might 
compe te directly with Br i t i sh-owned rai lroads. By 1929, Argent ina had 
eclipsed Cuba as the best customer for United States goods in Latin America. 
While the State Department conceived of the Pan American Union as an avenue 
for improved economic relations with Latin America generally, many Argentine 
leaders understood their nat ion 's economic interests to be tied to US objectives 
for trade and financial normalisation, through agreements and codifications of 
the Pan American Union. In short, for different though related trade interests, 
Argentina and the United States arrived at Havana with similar economic 
objectives.77 
United States control at the Havana Confe rence and the defea t of the 
Argent ine chal lenge marked the successful conclusion of a campaign for 
economic and diplomatic primacy in Latin America. Even so, Pueyrredon 's 
contradictory remarks in the aftermath of his resignation reinforced Kel logg 's 
erroneous conviction that foreign powers were manipulating Argentine anti-US 
positions. Never clear on the extent to which Pueyrredon 's views on tariffs and 
in t e rven t ion were an exp re s s ion of his g o v e r n m e n t ' s po l i c ies , K e l l o g g 
continued to believe that Pueyrredon 's position on Central America emanated 
f r o m ' M o s c o w ' , and was ' a i d e d and a b e t t e d by M e x i c o and a l s o by 
Communist ic organisations' in the United States.78 This projection of a Red 
Menace onto Argentina ignored a lingering bitterness in the Buenos Aires 
Foreign Off ice towards the government in Moscow, primed initially by the 
mistreatment of Argentine Counsellor J. Naveillan in the aftermath of the 
Russian Revolut ion . Through the Alvear adminis t ra t ion, as grounds for 
maintaining no formal relations with the Soviet Union, Gallardo cited that 
country ' s interference in the internal affairs of other nations - precisely the 
criticisms Kellogg levelled against the Soviets.79 
Although Ambassador Bliss could provide only weak supporting evidence, 
Kellogg became persuaded that anti-US hostility in Argentina was also the 
work of European commercial rivals. He believed that European newspapers 
had 'tried in every way to stir up trouble ' at Havana. The Secretary noted 
bitterly that British, French, and Italian journalists had joined in the attack on 
US interventionism while their governments had relied on the US military to 
protect European trading interests. The European press, it turned out, was more 
vehement in its assault on US military intervention in Central America than was 
the Argentine government.8 0 
Pueyrredon gambled his political future on a break with his own history of 
pro-US diplomacy. In combining the Argentine Foreign Ministry 's ambiguous 
instructions on Nicaragua with a harsh attack on high US tariffs, Pueyrredon 
wrongly assumed that the anti-US credentials he had earned at Havana would 
assure him a high-ranking post in the new Yrigoyen administration. By 
consolidating the support of the many Latin American governments, won 
months before the gathering, the United States was able to disarm the anti-
intervention threat. President Alvear and Foreign Minister Gallardo falsely 
presumed that Honorio Pueyrredon would comply with his professional duties 
as a diplomatic representative. In the first weeks of 1928, the Argentine 
government determined that the seemingly unqualified support it had promised 
to Ambassador Bliss represented too vigorous a backing of United States 
foreign policy - a position that might damage its international credibility with 
other Latin American states, should an anti-intervention resolution gain force. 
Yet by no means were the last-minute instructions to Pueyrredon issued as a 
challenge to the United States. Argentine leaders wished to pursue a foreign 
policy tack that suggested solidarity with other Latin American countries, while 
maintaining sound economic relations with the United States. Pueyrredon took 
advantage of this precarious balance. He not only countered his government 's 
interests, but also broke with the spirit of his own recent Nicaraguan mediation 
offer to Secretary Kellogg. The Argentine Foreign Ministry could not control 
the damage Pueyrredon caused. Because of this, the United States remained 
suspicious of the Argentines long after the conference ended. 
After the Havana Conference, the State Department savoured its victory. 
Francis White and others began a covert diplomatic probe into Pueyrredon's 
precise words while Frank Kellogg planned quickly for a fo l low-up Pan 
American meeting to reaffirm the triumph over Guerrero and Pueyrredon. 
Within weeks of the US delegates ' departure from Havana, the Secretary of 
State approached Charles Evans Hughes with a new mission. This time the 
venue would be Washington. A Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration 
was called by Pan American Union members to comply with their Havana 
resolution to discuss these matters at a later date.81 The conference would 
represent a capstone to the US diplomacy of control at Havana. In the 
establishment of elaborate rules for the mediation and arbitration of interna-
tional differences , the United States could avoid any scrutiny of its own 
military adventurism in Latin America.82 
President Calvin Coolidge first hesitated to ask Hughes to return to public 
service. The President worried that the State Department was riding 4 a willing 
horse to death ' . Hughes accepted Kellogg's invitation. His condition was that 
the American government follow the Havana example in establishing strict 
diplomatic control and a careful grip on the conference agenda. Hughes asked 
for preliminary meetings with members of the Senate and an exchange of views 
with Latin American governments. He reasoned that the United States should 
not enter a conference of such importance 'with the chance of disruption on 
account of extreme demands or of an endeavor to put the United States in an 
unfortunate position before the public opinion of the world' .8 3 
The Alvear administrat ion accepted the United States invitation to the 
arbitration and conciliation conference, naming as the count ry ' s delegates 
Car los A. Alcor ta and Luis A. Podes ta Costa , technical advisers in' the 
Argentine delegation at Havana. For reasons that are not clear, the Yrigoyen 
administration did not send the delegation.84 US authorities organised the 
conference with the endorsement of many of the same states that had supported 
Hughes at Havana. And after recent Senate recommendations in favour of an 
a rb i t ra t ion accord with Mex ico , Coo l idge be l ieved h imse l f to be in an 
unprecedented position of strength to negotiate a compulsory Pan American 
arbitrat ion treaty.85 A diverse variety of arbitration treaties between the 
United States and different Latin American republics existed at the time of the 
Sixth Pan American Conference. The US government intended to unify and 
s t andard i se these ag reemen t s , in the hope of concen t ra t ing fu r the r Pan 
American authority in Washington; by delimiting a formal grievance procedure 
for international disputes, United States policy-makers believed they could 
defuse the more public criticisms of US intervention witnessed at Havana. 
Policy-makers did not expect the results of the Washington Conference to 
obstruct United States military and political objectives in Central America. 
Standing arbitration treaties with Brazil, Ecuador, Haiti, Peru, and Uruguay 
called for the submission of disputes to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at 
the Hague. US officials planned to eliminate the differences in these accords. 
The United States hoped to implement an earlier treaty proposed at the Santiago 
Conference, and ratified by only some member countries. The 1923 Treaty to 
Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States differed substantially 
f rom agreements the United States had reached earlier with Latin American 
states.86 An important provision of the 1923 Treaty was the formation of a 
Permanent Committee on Arbitration with its seat at Washington. With the 
implementation of this accord, the United States would achieve the transference 
of international arbitrating authority f rom Europe to the United States.87 
The conference was held between 10 December 1928 and 5 January 1929, 
only n ine mon ths a f te r P u e y r r e d o n ' s con ten t ious s ta tements . Coo l idge 
i naugu ra t ed the ga the r ing and de l ega t e s e lec ted the Sec re ta ry of Sta te 
conference president. Kellogg maintained strict control of proceedings; in 
addition to the usual powers of a conference chair (to preside over meetings and 
submit topics for discussion) , Kel logg had the authori ty to prescr ibe all 
measures necessary for the 'maintenance of order ' and the strict compliance 
with meeting regulations.88 Conferees hastily modif ied international commis-
sions of conciliation created by the 1923 Convention, one of several notable 
changes enacted; until the Washington Conference of 1928-1929, only nations 
directly threatened by war could call such commissions into action. Now, any 
Pan American Union member could nominate the commissions to act, imparting 
a multinational basis for arbitration.89 
The Washington Conference aimed to provide a structured medium for the 
elimination of conflict in the Americas. As such, delegates empowered (indeed 
compelled) arbitration tribunals to reach swift verdicts within three months of 
their convening. Such rulings would be binding. On 5 January 1929, all Pan 
American Union member states (with the exception of the absent Argentina) 
signed a General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration. Yet the treaty would 
prove as limited in ending international conflict as was the League of Nations. 
The Mexican Foreign Ministry prematurely reported that during the conference 
the subject of armed conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia had arisen: 'The 
Conference of fered its good of f ices and the confl ict was avoided. ' The 
con fe rence could actual ly provide no pract ical s t ructure for a l leviat ing 
escalating Bolivian-Paraguayan hostilities that would lead to the Chaco War.90 
For the United States the meeting represented a successful ending to the 
problem of anti-intervention. The Havana Conference had provided a forum 
for criticism of American foreign relations, no matter how proficiently those 
criticisms had been countered. The Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration 
subsumed the question of military intervention under a Pan American forum 
even more carefully dominated by the United States. The well-intentioned 
delegates in Washington obscured the combative interference of Honorio 
Pueyrredon and others by promulgating a set of regulations that could not be 
implemented practically. In organising the conference and carefully overseeing 
its outcome, the United States had protected itself, for the time being, from 
further challenges against military intervention within the Pan American Union. 
The period of US diplomatic control within the Pan American Union was 
brief, but coincided with unprecedented United States economic achievements 
in Argentina and in the hemisphere. Consul General George S. Messersmith 
described the late 1920s as a golden era for US interests in Argentina:91 
Those were flourishing days in the Argentine. We had very important 
interests established in the country. American firms, such as Swift & 
Armour and Wilson, were very important in the meat-packing business. 
American interests had started the cement industry in the Argentine. Our 
people were increasingly active in the industrialization in the Argentine 
taking place at that time.92 
In 1929, American investors bought millions of dollars worth of British 
shares in South American concerns. Also in the year of the stock market crash 
and the onset of worldwide depression, the specialisation and quality of US 
exports secured certain markets for which goods from other nations could not 
compete. George Jackson Eder, head of the Latin American Section of the 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, estimated that fully 75% of United 
States exports to Argentine markets could not be challenged effectively because 
of production advantages. In reference to the Havana Conference, the British 
Foreign Office clerk G.H. Thompson commented that it was possible to attach 
too much importance to the 4 anti-United States sentiments of Latin-Americans ' . 
Their lack of solidarity and the powerful economic position of the United States 
vis-a-vis Central and South America made these sentiments 'rather fut i le ' . 
'However unpopular Wall Street might be ' , Thompson wrote, 'it also has its 
uses. '9 3 
Five years after the Havana Conference, at the height of the Great Depress-
ion, delegates met for the Seventh Pan American Conference in Montevideo. 
Influenced in part by the 1932 outbreak of war between Bolivia and Paraguay 
in the Chaco, the Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Saavedra Lamas reached 
Uruguay promoting an Anti-War Pact. More strictly founded in international 
precedents than Pueyr redon ' s chal lenge, and supported by several Latin 
American delegations, the Argentine proposal incorporated elements of earlier 
arbitration and conciliation accords, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. 
The Anti-War Pact explicitly prohibited foreign interventions. However, the 
anticipated US-Latin American clash over the scheme never occurred. Since 
1929, the strategic and economic position of the United States had changed 
markedly in relation to Argentina and within the Pan American movement 
generally. At the Seventh Pan American Conference in Montevideo, articulat-
ing Rooseve l t ' s Good Neighbor Policy, Secretary of State Cordelly Hull 
announced a posi t ion that reversed Char les Evans H u g h e s ' s de fence of 
intervention. Hull told his fellow delegates that the United States would no 
longer entertain military intervention as a foreign policy option.94 
Latin American diplomats and politicians - Argentine Foreign Minister 
Saavedra Lamas among them - congratulated themselves on having evoked so 
significant a reversal in United States-Latin American relations. Without 
q u e s t i o n , Lat in A m e r i c a n p re s su res p l ayed an impor tan t role in H u l l ' s 
concession to the national sovereignty of Latin American states. At Havana, 
the United States became party to a Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 
the eighth article of which stated that ' no state has a right to intervene in the 
internal or external affairs of another ' . The US economic retreat, however, was 
the overriding factor in the American diplomatic reversal. Before 1933, harsh 
economic condi t ions in the Uni ted States , c o m p o u n d e d by internat ional 
retaliation to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff , led to a decline in US strategic and 
commercial power in Latin America, and to the collapse of the dominance of 
the Pan American Union by the United States in the late 1920s. That strength 
would not be recaptured by Washington until the Second World War, after 
which the United States quickly set about renewing predominance within the 
newly constituted Organization of American States. 
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